While this book is, in the main, an abridgment of Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, it contains some paragraphs which are not founded on the text of the larger work, and its arrangement of topics is entirely new. Its editors lay stress upon the fact that it "contains no notes except the bare citation of cases." They have adopted this policy, they declare, because "the experience, both of teacher and pupil, amply establishes the fact that comments and statements in the notes especially when in conflict with, or in modification of, the law as announced in the text, are well-springs of confusion, doubt and difficulty to the student." This would indicate that the book should have been entitled "Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Made Easy for Beginners."

We had hoped to find Lord Mansfield distinguished from Sir James Mansfield in this volume; but are disappointed. Evidently, Mr. Douglass labors under Mr. Daniel's delusion that the two are one, and that in some mysterious way, the shade of the illustrious Chief Justice of the King's Bench became the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. In the next edition we trust to find the word "Lord" in § 152 superseded by "Sir James."

The Negotiable Instruments Law of New York is printed in an Appendix, with notes indicating the numbering of the various sections in other States. Notwithstanding this presentation of the statute, we do not find any reference to its provisions in the text. Many topics, including especially that of "holder for value," and of "irregular indorser," would have been presented much more satisfactorily, had the rules of the statute respecting them been set forth in connection with the conflicting decisions, which those rules were intended to supplant.

While we have not hesitated to criticize the shortcomings of this volume, we ought not to close our comments without stating that we consider it one of the best elementary treatises on negotiable instruments which have been published.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS.—By Henry Campbell Black. Second Edition. Two Volumes. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1902. pp. ccii, 1592.

The author who prepares a text-book for the use of practising lawyers must necessarily have in mind the facts that these busy men presumably have already had their systematic training in law, and are not likely to make an exhaustive and careful study of any such work; and that, to be of use to them, there must be such a minute subdivision of topics that they may be able to find quickly a reliable statement of what the law is on the particular question which they have under consideration, and a citation of good authorities upholding the statement.

The recognition of these facts results, in many cases, in the production of a book which shows little effort to treat the subject logically, and whose bulk often arises from much needless repetition, and the failure on the part of the author to properly condense and digest the material he has gathered together.

It is seldom, therefore, that a modern legal text-book can, at the same time, be recommended both to students and practitioners, and

it is a pleasure to a reviewer when he finds one which seems to justify such a recommendation as does the work under consideration. The usefulness of the original edition and the decisions made during the twelve years since it appeared, are a sufficient warrant for the issuing of the second edition, which will, undoubtedly, meet a demand from those who are already in active practice, and any student will find time well-spent which is devoted to the careful study of these volumes. The work presents a natural, logical and quite exhaustive treatment of the entire subject. There are, it is believed, as few inaccuracies of statement as are ever likely to be found in a book of this character. The author is not afraid to enter into a discussion of disputed questions, and to express an opinion as to the proper answer; and, although he has evidently striven for and succeeded in attaining the power of stating a point concisely, he has not thereby, as is so often the case, sacrificed clearness.

Since it is believed that all this may be justly said, it seems, perhaps, hypercritical to call attention to some minor defects, and yet a review would hardly be fair which passed them by without notice.

Simply as indicative of other defects of a like nature which might be pointed out, the following matters relating to New York law may be mentioned.

Under the author's § 84 declaring the general rule that a judgment entered by default is irregular or erroneous unless founded on a "good and sufficient declaration or complaint duly filed in the action," no mention is made of the practice authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure of entering judgment by default in certain specified cases of actions on contract, without any complaint, provided the notice specified in § 419 of the Code has been served with the summons. Under his § 232 with reference to strict construction of statutes authorizing constructive service of process, the author states without qualification that "defendants cannot be summoned by publication unless shown to be non-residents," which, of course, is not true, under the New York statutes. Sections of the repealed Code of Procedure are occasionally cited instead of the corresponding sections of the present Code of Civil Procedure, and citations are frequently made of decisions of the inferior Courts of the State, although decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York upon the same point, and upholding the doctrine stated in the text, might readily have been found.

It may also be suggested that if citations were grouped under an alphabetical arrangement of States, the usefulness of the work as a time-saver for the busy lawyer would be greatly increased, as under the arrangement which has been adopted, a lawyer seeking authorities binding in his own jurisdiction must often examine with very great care a half-page or more of citations, or run the risk of overlooking a decision of his own State that might prove to be extremely important; but as these criticisms indicate, the defects in the work are not of such a nature as to affect greatly its substantial accuracy or to interfere seriously with its usefulness.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. By George P. Voorhees: The Laning Co., Norwalk, O. 1903. pp. lxxxvi., 577.